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Abstract—Proof of Work (PoW) and Byzantine Fault Tolerant
(BFT) are the two main classes of consensus protocols that are
used in the blockchain consensus layer. PoW is highly scalable but
very slow with performance of about 7 transactions/second. BFT-
based protocols are highly efficient for small networks, but their
scalability is limited to only tens of nodes. One of the main reasons
for the BFT limitation is the quadratic O(n2) communication
complexity of BFT-based protocols for n nodes, which requires
n×n broadcasting. In this paper, we present the Musch protocol
which is BFT-based and provides communication complexity
O(fn+ n) for f failures and n nodes, where f < n/3, without
compromising the latency. Hence, the performance adjusts to f
such that for constant f the communication complexity is linear.
Musch achieves this by introducing the notion of exponentially
increasing windows of nodes to which complains are reported,
instead of broadcasting to all the nodes. To our knowledge,
this is the first BFT-based blockchain protocol which efficiently
addresses simultaneously the issues of communication complexity
and latency under the presence of failures.
I. INTRODUCTION
Consensus is used to agree on a new block to be appended
to the chain by the nodes in the network. A blockchain is
compromised of two main components:a cryptographic engine
and a consensus engine. The main performance and scalability
bottleneck of a blockchain also lies in these components.
Here we only focus on improving consensus component of
blockchains. As already mentioned, PoW-based protocols are
highly scalable. In Bitcoin [1], which is one of the most
successful implementation of blockchain technology, typically
the number of nodes (replicas) are usually large in the range
of thousands [1], [2].
PoW involves the calculation of a number based on the
hash value of a block adjusted by a difficulty level. Solving
this cryptographic puzzle by nodes (miners) limits the rate of
the block generation as solving the puzzle is CPU intensive.
Bitcoin uses PoW but the number of transactions per second
can reach up to just 7 transactions per second [2]. The block
generation rate is approximately 10 minutes [1]. Additionally,
the power utilized by Bitcoin mining in 2014 was between 0.1-
10 GW and was comparable to Ireland’s electricity consump-
tion at that time [3]. Different solutions were proposed, for
example, Ethereum [4] uses faster PoW, BitcoinNG [5] uses
two types of blocks, namely, key blocks and micro-blocks,
and has achieved 10× more throughput in comparison with
Bitcoin. But all these solutions fall well short of matching the
throughput offered by leading credit-card companies (2000 on
average and 10000 maximum transactions per second).
On other the hand, BFT-based [6] protocols guarantee
consensus in the presence of malicious (Byzantine) nodes,
which can fail in arbitrary ways including crashes, software
bugs and even coordinated malicious attacks. Typically, BFT-
based algorithms execute in epochs, where in each epoch the
correct (non-malicious) nodes achieve agreement for a set
of proposed transactions. In each epoch there is a primary
node that helps to reach agreement. The consensus is achieved
during each epoch and an entry or a set of entries are added to
the log. In case the primary is found to be Byzantine,a view
change (select new primary) takes effect to provide liveness.
These protocols have shown the ability to achieve throughput
of tens of thousand transactions per second [7], [8]. However,
their scalability has been tested with a very small number of
nodes n, usually 10 to 20 nodes, due to the requirement for
n×n broadcast [2], that is, they have quadratic communication
complexity.
To address the scalability issues in BFT protocols, we
introduce the Musch blockchain protocol. Musch is BFT-based
and achieves O(fn + n) communication complexity in an
epoch, where f is the actual number of Byzantine nodes
(f < n/3). For small (i.e. constant) f the communication com-
plexity is linear, and hence, Musch has scalable performance.
Musch does not need to know the actual value of f since it
automatically adjusts to the actual number of nodes that exhibit
faulty behavior in each epoch. At the same time, the latency is
comparable with other efficient BFT-based protocols [7], [9].
The performance of our algorithm is based on a novel
mechanism of communication with a set of window nodes.
Nodes reach sliding windows moving over node IDs to recover
from faults during consensus. If a replica does not receive ex-
pected messages from the primary, it complains to the window
nodes from which it recovers updates (see Fig. 1). Initially, the
window consists of only one node. If the complainer replica
doesn’t receive a valid response from any of the the window
nodes, it considers the next window of double size to which
it sends the complaint. The last window size is no more than
2f which guarantees to have a correct node within the last
window. This gives O(fn+n) communication complexity. In
this way, Musch avoids n × n broadcasts while guaranteeing
consistency.
Table I compares Musch with other state of art BFT-based
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PBFT FastBFT Aliph Musch
Total Replicas n 3f ′ + 1 2f ′ + 1 3f ′ + 1 3f ′ + 1
Critical Path 4 3 + log(f ′ + 1) 3f ′ + 2 4
Communication
Complexity O(n
2) O(n2) O(n2) O(fn+ n)
TABLE I: Characteristics of state of Art BFT protocols. The
actual faulty nodes is f , while f ′ is an upper bound, f ≤ f ′.
protocols such as PBFT [9], FastBFT [10], and Aliph [8].
We compared the communication complexity measured as
number of total exchanged messages during an epoch. Our
algorithm’s performance depends solely on fn, while the other
algorithms have quadratic communication complexity. Hence,
our algorithm has an advantage when f is asymptotically
smaller than n, resulting in less than quadratic communication
complexity. When f is a constant our algorithm is optimal.
Additionally, we also compared the critical path length, as
the number of one-way message latency it takes for a client
request to be processed and the response is received by the
client. Note that the total number of nodes is n = 3f ′ + 1,
where f ′ is a conservative upper bound on the number of
faulty nodes. The actual faults are bounded by f ≤ f ′. Our
algorithm does not need to know f .
SBFT [11] has also tried to address the issue of scalability
and have tested their protocol with 100 replicas, while achiev-
ing 10× better performance than Ethereum. In normal mode
when f = 0, SBFT’s message complexity will be O(nc) (c
is the number of collectors) as compared to Musch’s O(n).
The actual value of Byzantine nodes (f ) has to be known (to
choose correct c such that c ≥ f ) for the system to avoid the
fall-back protocol. But in practice it is impossible to know
the actual value of f (avoiding fallback is not possible for
small c). Fall-back mode executes efficient PBFT with O(n2)
complexity. This O(n2) complexity causes additional latency
and performance degradation in SBFT.
PAPER OUTLINE
We continue with this paper as follows. In Section II, we
give the model of the distributed system. In Section III, we
present our algorithm. Protocol checkpoints are presented in
Section IV. We give the correctness analysis in Section V, and
the communication complexity bound analysis in Section VI.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Like other BFT-based state machine replication protocols
Musch also assumes an adversarial failure model. Under this
model, servers and even clients may deviate from their normal
behavior in arbitrary ways, which includes hardware failures,
software bugs, or malicious intent. Our protocol can tolerate
up to f ′ number of Byzantine replicas where the total number
of replicas in the network n = 3f ′+1. Replica ID is an integer
from the replica set {1, . . . , n} that identifies each replica. The
actual number of Byzantine replicas in the network is denoted
by f , and at any moment during execution 0 ≤ f ≤ f ′. If
f = 0 then the execution is fault-free. However, f may not
be known. Our algorithm’s communication complexity adapts
to any value of f .
Fig. 1: Windows of nodes
III. PROTOCOL
Our proposed protocol uses echo broadcast [12], where the
primary proposes a block of transactions, and replicas respond
by sending back signed hashes of the block. We assume strong
adversarial coordinated attacks by various malicious replicas.
However, replicas will not be able to break collision resistant
hashes, encryption, or signatures. We assume that all messages
sent by replicas and the primary are signed. For example if
primary p proposes a block of transactions 〈B〉p to the replica
i, we assume that it has been signed by primary p. Any
unsigned message will be discarded. To avoid repetition of
message and signatures, Musch also uses signature aggregation
[13] to use a single collective signature instead of appending
all replica signatures, to keep signature size constant. As
the primary p receives message Mi with their respective
signatures σi from each replica i, the primary then uses these
received signatures to generate an aggregated signature σ.
The aggregated signature can be verified by replicas given
the messages M1,M2, . . . ,My where y ≤ n, the aggregated
signature σ, and public keys PK1, PK2, . . . , PKy . Like other
BFT-based protocols [9], [14], [15] each replica i knows the
public keys of other replicas in the network. In Section III-B
we explain how to use the IDs to define the windows that we
use in the algorithm.
It is not possible to ensure the safety and liveness of
consensus algorithms in asynchronous systems where even a
single replica can crash fail [16]. Musch’s safety holds in
asynchronous environments. But to circumvent this impos-
sibility for liveness, Musch assumes partial synchrony [17].
This partial synchrony is achieved by using arbitrarily large
unknown but fixed worst case global stabilization delays.
During normal operation, Musch guarantees that at least
2f ′ + 1 replicas in each epoch are consistent (out of the
n = 3f ′ + 1). Let T be the maximum round-trip message
delay in the network. In our algorithm, at any moment of
time, the suffix of the execution histories between any two
replicas differ by at most the maximum number of blocks that
can be committed during a time period of O(T log f ′). Thus,
any inconsistency is limited to only a small period of time.
Musch executes in epochs. An epoch is a slot of time
in which 2f ′ + 1 replicas receive block B proposed by
the primary p and agree to commit it. Thus, during each
epoch a block is generated and added to the chain. Since
p is responsible for aggregating replica signatures for block
agreement, if less than 2f ′+1 replica signatures are collected
then a view change will be triggered and the primary will
be changed. It should be noted that p is also responsible for
collecting transactions from clients, ordering the transactions,
and sending them to the replicas.
Algorithm 1: Primary p
1 Latest committed block sequence number is sp
2 upon receipt of transactions from a set of clients C do
3 Create a block B with sequence number sp + 1
4 Broadcast B to replicas
5 upon receipt of 2f ′ + 1 hashes Hi of B from
replicas do
6 Aggregate the hashes into H
7 Commit (B,H)
8 Broadcast H to replicas
9 Send REPLY to client set C
10 end
11 end
A. Normal Operation
As shown in Algorithm 1, the primary p collects a set of
transactions from the clients into an ordered list of transactions
La (which it will propose in a candidate block) with a
sequence number s, view number v, hash d = hash(La),
and hash history hs = Hash(hs−1, d) into candidate block
B = 〈〈ORDER, s, v, d, hs〉p, La〉. Primary p then proposes
(broadcasts) the candidate block B to each replica i. As shown
in Algorithm 2, upon receipt of B each replica i validates
the information, and then replica i responds to the primary
p with the willingness to accept the block in a message
Hi = 〈RESPONSE, s, v, d, i〉i to the primary.
The primary collects at least 2f ′ + 1 responses from the
replicas, aggregates them to H , and generates a compressed
aggregated signature σ [13]. Then, the primary broadcasts
〈COMMIT,H〉σ . Upon receipt, each replica i verifies 2f ′+1
signatures and the candidate block B commits. If verified
successfully each replica i responds to the client with the reply
message 〈REPLY, s, v, c, r, t, i〉σi , where c is the client, t is
the timestamp and r is the result of execution. Upon receipt
of f ′+ 1 valid REPLY messages (which might take 2f ′+ 1
messages to receive) a client accepts the result. Assuming
a continuous creation of blocks, the primary starts the new
epoch immediately after the old epoch finishes. Let T be
the maximum delivery delay of a message in the network.
According to the protocol, in the epoch of the new block
B with sequence number s there will be two messages that
replica i expects to receive from the primary: (i) the ORDER
type message for block B with sequence s within ∆2 = T
time from the end of the previous epoch, and then (ii) the
COMMIT type message for block s within ∆3 = 2T time
since the receipt of the ORDER message. Therefore, the
maximum time for an epoch for a replica i is ∆1 = ∆2 +∆3.
A replica i goes into recovery mode at time ∆1 if either of
the two expected messages is not received.
B. Recovery Mode
In BFT protocols, when a replica detects an error it broad-
casts complaints to all replicas in the network. In contrast
to this, a replica in Musch during a failure event will only
Algorithm 2: Replica i
// Normal Execution
1 Latest committed block sequence number is si
2 upon receipt of block B from primary p with sequence
number s do
3 Calculate hash Hi of block B
4 Send Hi to primary p
5 upon receipt of aggregated hash H for block B from
primary do
6 if H is signed by at least 2f ′ + 1 replicas then
7 Commit (B,H)
8 Send REPLY to each client c
9 end
10 end
11 end
// Special Cases
12 check always at any time that
13 if no receipt of expected si + 1 block B or respective
hash H within a timeout period then
14 Execute Algorithm 3 with parameter Complain
15 end
16 if receipt of a block B with sequence s > si + 1 then
17 Execute Algorithm 3 with parameter Complain
18 end
19 if receipt of valid set of complains S with f ′ + 1
complainers then
20 Execute Algorithm 5 // initiate view
change
21 end
22 end
complain to a subset of replicas in the network called window
nodes. If i did not receive a response from the current window
then the replica complains to the next window of double size
until it receive response from at least one correct replica.
The window sequences are fixed, W1,W2, . . . ,Wk′ , where
k′ = dlg(f ′ + 1)e. Suppose the replica IDs are taken from
the set {1, . . . , n} and sorted in ascending order (see Fig. 1).
The window W1 consists of a single node with the smallest
ID, Window W2 consists of two replicas with the next IDs
in order, Window W3 consists of four replicas with the next
higher IDs, and so on. Therefore the window Wj consists of
2j−1 replicas, whose IDs are ranked between 2j−1, . . . , 2j−1.
During the execution of the algorithm, the maximum window
that will be contacted is actually k = dlg(f + 1)e, where
k ≤ k′, since this guarantees that at least one correct node
will be encountered among all the window nodes from W1 up
to Wk.
Algorithm 3 describes how a replica complains to the
window(s), and Algorithm 4 shows the respective reactions
from the window nodes. As shown in Algorithm 3, if replica
i complains that it didn’t receive expected message (ORDER
or COMMIT ) from p during normal operation, it sends the
Algorithm 3: Fault Recovery in Replica i
Parameters: Complain from i
1 Let l be the block sequence number in Complain for
which i has not received either B or H
2 j = 1 // window index
// current window is Wj
3 if i ∈Wj then
// all window nodes prior to Wj are
faulty
4 Broadcast COMPLAIN message to replicas
5 else
// i is in a later window than Wj or
i is not a window node at all
6 Send COMPLAIN to all nodes in window Wj
7 if there is no commit by a certain timeout then
8 j = j + 1 // increase window
9 Goto Line 3
10 end
11 end
// listen for responses
12 Let l′ ≥ l be the expected sequence number of blocks in
the time period since Complain issued
13 upon receipt of blocks and respective hashes up to at
least l′ do
14 Commit all received pairs of block and hash (B,H)
15 end
complaint in the form of 〈COMPLAIN, s, v, d〉i, where d
and s belongs to the last committed block in the chain of i.
If it complains to a window Wj , this message is sent to all
nodes in Wj which will then know that replica i does not have
ORDER or COMMIT messages after block s. If replica
i has received a message from the primary that proves the
maliciousness of p, then it attaches the proof in its complaint
〈COMPLAIN,PROOF 〉i to Wj .
When i enters the recovery mode it first complains to
window W1, which has a single node. If i doesn’t get any
useful response from W1 then it complains to W2, which
has two nodes, so it informs both nodes. This process can
repeat until i contacts all nodes in Wk, the last window. It is
guaranteed that replica i will get a response from a correct
node in one of these windows. As shown in Algorithm 4,
the window nodes respond to complaints by returning the
requested information. If they do not have it then they call
themselves Algorithm 3 as well. If the complainer i is a
window node itself, it will stop until it reaches its own window
size and will broadcast the complaint. Upon broadcast it is
guaranteed that it will receive response. The response can
be either receipt of missing messages or a view change. If
replica i received the missing messages it will forward it to
the complainers that it knows, else it will result in view change
(primary will be replaced).
Note that regular replicas and window nodes may be com-
plaining at the same time and probably for the same reason.
Algorithm 4: Window Node i
1 upon receipt of COMPLAIN or PROOF message
from replica j do
2 if COMPLAIN from j is valid then
3 Add COMPLAIN by distinct complainer to the
set of complains S
4 if distinct number of complainers in S is at least
f ′ + 1 then
5 Broadcast S
6 Execute Algorithm 5
7 Reset S to empty
8 else
9 Let l be the sequence number of block
requested in COMPLAIN
10 if i has the lth block and its hash then
11 Send all blocks and respective hashes
starting from sequence l up to the latest
to replica j
12 end
13 end
14 end
15 else if PROOF is valid then
16 Broadcast PROOF to replicas
17 Execute Algorithm 5
18 Reset S to empty
19 end
20 end
A regular node will have to wait for the window nodes to first
obtain a response. It is important to coordinate the actions
of the windows nodes and the regular replicas to receive the
responses efficiently without message replication. For a regular
replica i, the timeout period for waiting a response from the
window Wj is at most Λj = j3T + 6T . As it takes ∆1 = 3T
to detect timeout for the current epoch, then it takes at most
j3T to receive a message from the previous window and send
the message back to the replica. In case window j does not
receive a message from window j − 1, it will broadcast its
complaint and it is guaranteed that it will receive a response,
which it will send back to replica i (3T ). From the start time t
of the current epoch, if i does not get a response within t+Λj
then it will contact the next window Wj+1.
C. View Change
A view change can be triggered if a correct window node
i ∈ Wl receives at least f ′ + 1 distinct replica complaints
(against primary p) as shown in Algorithm 4. This guarantees
that at least one of the complaints is coming from a correct
replica.
Another reason for view change can be the receipt of an
explicit PROOF against p by window node i. Once view
change is triggered, window node i broadcasts the set of
COMPLAIN or PROOF messages it has received to all
replicas (Algorithm 4).
Without loss of generality, consider the case where window
node i has sent PROOF to all replicas (the same mechanism
also applies to other sets of COMPLAIN messages). Upon
receipt of PROOF a replica j increments its view number
(v = v + 1) and assigns new primary p′ (namely, p′ = v
mod n) (Algorithm 5).
Replica j then adds its most recent block hash d and block
number s in the message along with PROOF in a message
〈V IEWCHANGE,PROOF, s, d, j〉j and sends it to the
new primary p′ (Algorithm 5).
Upon receipt of at least 2f ′ + 1 view change messages
from different replicas, p′ stores them into set Q. Then, p′
broadcasts 〈Q〉σ , where σ is an aggregated signature for all
replicas involved in Q (Algorithm 6). Upon receipt of this
message, each replica recovers the latest block history. Assume
s′ is the highest block number committed so far in the chain.
The block s′ must have been committed by at least 2f ′ + 1
replicas, and since Q has size at least 2f ′+ 1, it must be that
f ′+1 replicas in Q have also committed s′, one of which is a
correct node. Thus, every replica upon receipt of Q can figure
out that the latest committed valid block number is s′.
Once s′ is known, a replica i will check if block with
sequence s′ is the latest block in its history hi, and if it is, i
sends a confirmation message s′i to p
′ (Algorithm 5).
In this case, at least f ′ + 1 correct replicas know the latest
block of p′ (s′p′ ). If s
′ is same as s′p′ then p
′ begins updating
all other replicas that have fallen behind (Algorithm 6). p′
will not send any block generated earlier than the water mark
H (Section IV). If p′ does not have s′ as its latest block then
at least f ′ + 1 correct replicas know about it and they send
missing blocks and their respective COMMIT messages to p′
and then p′ updates other replicas as described above. Once
p′ has updated other replicas it will wait to receive at least
2f ′+ 1 correct replicas have sent confirmation s′i (Algorithm
6).
Since there are at least 2f ′ + 1 correct replicas, p′ signs
the latest block in their histories that p′ has received using
an aggregated signature V ← ⋃i〈s′i〉σ and broadcasts it to
the replicas. Upon receipt of V each replica is now ready for
the new epoch of the next block and is waiting to receive an
ORDER message from the new primary p′ (Algorithm 5). In
case a replica does not receive expected messages (Q, V or
blocks and their hashes within a certain expected time), then
it issues a new complaint which is processed similar to the
other types of complaints as described above.
During the view change process there may be some clients
who send their request but it will not be processed because
replicas are busy. To address this as we mentioned earlier the
client c will broadcast its request after epoch time ∆1, if it
did not receive the response from p. In such case, all replicas
receive the request Tc and forward it to the p. Upon receipt of
2f ′+1 such forwarded requests, p considers Tc to be included
in the ORDER message as soon as possible. p will have
to propose those backlogged requests before proposing the
new requests it receives. If it proposes a request that has not
been seen by 2f ′ + 1 replicas (of which f ′ + 1 replicas are
Algorithm 5: Replica i View Change
1 Select new primary p′ = v mod n
2 Send V IEWCHANGE containing latest local block
number si to p′
3 Receive aggregated V IEWCHANGEs Q from p′
4 if Q contains at least 2f ′ + 1 V IEWCHANGEs then
5 Get the latest block number (s′) that has been signed
by at least f ′ + 1 replicas in Q
6 if latest block si in replica i is same as s′ then
7 Replica has not lost any block
8 else
9 Receive messages (blocks and their respective
hashes) up to s′ from p′ before timeout
10 end
11 Once updated (s′i = s
′) send s′i to p
′
12 Receive V from p′ containing aggregated histories of
at least 2f ′ + 1 replicas
13 end
correct/honest replicas) proposing the backlogged transactions
then the replicas can send a complaint which will result in a
view change.
Algorithm 6: New Primary View Change
1 Receive V IEWCHANGE messages from replicas
2 Aggregate at least 2f ′ + 1 V IEWCHANGE messages
into Q
3 Broadcast Q to replicas
4 Get the latest block number (s′) that has been signed by
at least f ′ + 1 replicas in Q
5 if latest block in p′ is same as s′ then
6 New primary p′ has not lost any block
7 else
8 Receive messages (blocks and their respective hashes)
up to s′ from f ′ + 1 replicas that are up to date
9 end
10 Send messages with missing blocks and hashes to all
replicas i who have fallen behind, si < s′, where si
should not be less than latest water mark
11 Once received updated s′i from each replica i, where
s′i = s
′, aggregate s′i into V
12 Broadcast V
IV. CHECKPOINTS
As an optimization to the protocol, we use checkpoints
to improve on the number of messages exchanged during
view change. Checkpoints are typically used as a way to
truncate the log in other BFT-based protocols [9]. In addition
to that, we can also use it to prevent malicious replicas
from downloading older messages from a new primary p′
and delaying the completion of the view change process. As
we know from Section III-B, some correct replicas might
miss messages and go into recovery mode. These replicas
need to download those missing messages. But malicious
replicas might try to download very old blocks and delay the
view change process. To bound this we use checkpoints. To
maintain the safety condition it is required that at least 2f ′+1
replicas agree on the checkpoint. The checkpoint is created
after a constant number of blocks (e.g., sequence number
divisible by 200). In Musch, replicas can agree on checkpoints
during block agreement (checkpoint number to be added to the
RESPONSE message). A checkpoint that is agreed upon by
2f ′+ 1 replicas of which at least f ′+ 1 are honest is called a
stable checkpoint. Checkpoints have low and high watermarks.
Low watermark h is the last stable checkpoint and the high
water mark H is the sum of low water mark and k number of
blocks(H = k + h), where k is large enough (i.e. k = 400).
If a replica wants to download a block older than H , p′ will
ignore the download request and might think that the replica
is maliciously trying to delay the view change process.
V. CORRECTNESS ANALYSIS
In this section we provide proof of correctness and analysis
of the Musch protocol. Before we proceed, it is important
to define transaction completion and protocol correctness for
the Musch protocol. We say that a transaction Tc issued by
a client c is considered to be completed by c if c receives
at least f ′ + 1 valid 〈REPLY, s, v, c, r, t, i〉σi messages. It is
guaranteed that upon receipt of 2f ′ + 1 REPLY messages
from different replicas at least f ′+1 of them are valid. We will
prove that Musch satisfies the following correctness criteria:
Definition 1 (Liveness). Every transaction proposed by the
correct client will eventually be completed in finite time.
Definition 2 (Safety). A system is safe if a correct primary
proposes a block of ordered transactions with block number
s and it is committed by at least 2f ′ + 1 replicas, then any
block that has been committed earlier will have smaller block
number (s′ < s) in the chain. Thus, block Bs′ will be the prefix
of block Bs in the chain. Additionally the order of transactions
within the block will remain identical in all correct replicas
(due to Merkle tree1).
A. Safety
Lemma 1. Any two committed blocks Bs′ and Bs must have
a different block number.
Proof. Consider committed blocks Bs′ and Bs. At least a
set of 2f ′ + 1 replicas S1 have agreed to all transactions
with Bs′ and have committed it. Similarly, at least a set of
2f ′ + 1 replicas have agreed for the transactions in block Bs
and committed it. Since there are 3f ′ + 1 replicas, there is at
least one correct replica (out of the at least f ′ + 1 replicas in
S1 ∩ S2) that committed both for Bs′ and Bs. But a correct
replica only commits one block with a specific block number.
Thus, both blocks must have different numbers. The same
mechanism applies during recovery mode.
1Merkle trees are hash-based data structures in which each leaf node is
hash of a data block and each non leaf node is hash of its children. It is
mainly used for efficient data verification.
Lemma 2. If block Bs′ commits earlier than block Bs, then
Bs′ has a smaller block number than Bs.
Proof. As per Lemma 1, at least one correct replica k has
committed both Bs′ and Bs. Suppose, that Bs′ gets a block
number s′ which is smaller than the block number s of Bs,
that is s′ < s (s 6= s′ from Lemma 1). A correct Replica k
will only accept Bs if Bs is consistent with its local history
(only if s > s′ ).
Lemma 3. Musch is safe during view change.
Proof. During a view change (Algorithms 5 and 6), all replicas
including the new primary p′ retrieve the latest history and
block number s′ as at least f ′ + 1 replicas will agree on the
latest block number s′, which includes a correct replica that
knows s′. All correct replicas know the latest block s′p′ in the
history of p′ from 〈Q〉σ . If s′p′ = s′ then p′ begins updating
all other replicas that have fallen behind in history, in other
words it updates all the replicas that do not have blocks and
respective COMMIT messages up to s′. If p′ does not have
s′ as its latest block then at least f ′+ 1 correct replicas know
about it (from Q) and they send missing blocks and their
respective COMMIT messages to p′ and then p′ updates
other replicas as described above. Once p′ updated (receive
blocks and COMMIT s up to s′) other replicas it will take
T timeout period to receive si (update confirmation) from at
least 2f ′ + 1 replicas. Then, p′ signs all their histories using
an aggregated signature V ← ⋃i〈si〉σ and broadcasts it to
the replicas. Upon receipt of V each replica is now ready for
the new epoch of the next block and is waiting to receive an
ORDER message from the new primary p′.
Theorem 4 (Safety). Musch is safe.
Proof. Lemma 3 guarantees safety when the new primary p′
is correct. If p′ is not correct, safety will be guaranteed when
eventually a correct primary will be chosen. Therefore, based
on Lemmas 1, 2 and 3, Musch is safe when replicas are either
in normal, recovery, or view change mode.
B. Liveness
In this section we provide a proof for liveness of Musch.
Lemma 5. Musch satisfies liveness when the primary is
correct.
Proof. Consider a correct primary p that executes Algorithm
1, and also the replicas that execute Algorithm 2. Primary
p receives at least 2f ′ + 1 correct RESPONSE messages
from replicas, aggregates and signs them using an aggregation
signature σ. It then broadcasts the signed COMMIT message
to all replicas. Upon receipt of the COMMIT message each
replica will commit the block. The primary p along with all
correct replicas also forwards a reply message to each client
〈REPLY, s, v, c, r, t, i〉 and clients will mark the transaction
as completed.
Lemma 6. If there are f ′ + 1 complaints, or there is a
complaint with a proof of maliciousness against the primary,
then a view change will occur.
Proof. Algorithm 3 guarantees that, in the worst case, a replica
i can find a window node Wk to complain, where, k = dlg(f+
1)e and Wk contains at least one correct replica, since Wk
contains at least 2lg(f+1) = f + 1 nodes. Observe that once
a replica i has found a honest window node, it is guaranteed
that the honest node will reply to its valid complaint either
by sending back blocks and COMMIT s or if the number
of complaints are greater than f ′, then the window node will
broadcast all complaints to the network causing a view change
(Algorithm 4).
If a replica j ∈ Wk receives at least f ′ + 1 complaints
from other replicas it triggers a view change according to
the Algorithm 4. Since f ′ + 1 complaints are received, this
guarantees that at least one honest replica has complained.
Similarly, j may receive an explicit proof that the primary
p is faulty (p’s history is incorrect, or it has proposed an
invalid transaction, etc.). In such a case only one complaint is
needed to prove that p is malicious and a view change will be
triggered.
Lemma 7. If a transaction is not completed then a view
change will occur.
Proof. If a transaction does not complete after sufficient time
∆1, then the client c broadcasts its transaction Tc to the
replicas. Upon receipt of Tc, the replicas check if they have
already committed a block that contains Tc. If they did, each
replica i will send 〈ACK,Tc〉i to the client and upon receipt of
2f ′+1 ACK messages the client will consider the transaction
as complete. If primary p has not proposed the transaction
Tc, then each replica will forward Tc to p and will expect
that p will include it in the next ORDER message (during
normal operation). If p does not include it in the next ORDER
message, then replicas will start complaining, which will result
in a view change (if at least f ′ + 1 replicas complain, from
Lemma 6).
Another case that can prevent a request from being com-
mitted is when replicas receive a COMMIT message signed
by less than 2f ′ + 1 replicas. In this case, this can be used
as proof against p and a complaint can be made, which will
result in a view change (Lemma 6).
Lemma 8. Musch satisfies liveness even if a client request is
received during a view change.
Proof. During the view change process, there may be some
clients who send their request for transaction Tc but it will
not be processed because replicas are busy with the view
change. To address this, as mentioned earlier the client c will
broadcast its request after epoch timeout ∆1, if it did not
receive a response from p. In such a case, all replicas receive
the request Tc and forward it to the new primary p′. Upon
receipt of 2f ′+1 such forwarded requests the p′ considers Tc
to be included in the ORDER message as soon as possible.
The new primary p′ will have to propose those backlogged
client requests during the view change, before proposing the
new requests it receives. If it proposes a request that has not
been seen by 2f ′ + 1 replicas (of which f ′ + 1 replicas are
correct/honest replicas), proposing the backlogged transactions
then the replicas can start complaints, which will result in a
new view change (Lemma 6).
Theorem 9 (Liveness). Musch satisfies liveness and all cor-
rect transactions will be completed eventually.
Proof. Based on Lemmas 5, 7 and 8, any correct transaction
request by a client will be completed within a finite period of
time.
VI. COMMUNICATION COMPLEXITY
In communication complexity, we count all messages that
cause a reaction in our algorithm and we refer to these as
effective messages. In contrast, there are ineffective messages,
which have sources that have been identified as malicious,
and so the recipient can ignore these messages. We will
measure the number of effective messages exchanged in an
epoch, and we will consider worst cases scenarios, with or
without view change. In other words, we consider worst-
case performance attacks when malicious replicas attempt
to increase the communication of the protocol by causing
messages to be sent from correct replicas.
In the communication complexity we consider separately
the messages sent between clients and replicas, and those sent
only between replicas.
A. Client-Replica Communication Complexity
If a client sends a transaction to the primary p, and does
not receive a response from the primary p within ∆1, then
the client broadcasts to the primary p (a broadcast involves n
messages). Upon receipt of a broadcast from a client, if replica
i has already processed the client’s transaction it will answer
to the client with an acknowledgement. If not, the replica i
will forward the client’s request to the primary, forcing it to
process it as soon as possible. The liveness property of our
algorithm, Theorem 9, will guarantee that eventually at least
2f ′ + 1 = O(n) of the replicas will send acknowledgements
to the client. Therefore, we get the following result:
Lemma 10. For each transaction sent by a client, at most
O(n) messages will be exchanged between the client and the
replicas in order to process the transaction (i.e., include the
transaction in a block).
B. Replica-Replica Communication Complexity
In this section we analyze the communication complexity
of the consensus engine of our protocol, which includes the
primary p and the replicas (in total n nodes). A malicious
primary p and malicious replicas both can try to increase the
communication complexity.
1) Messages caused by malicious primary: Let Rc be the
set of replicas that complain. First, we examine the case when
the nodes in Rc did not receive the block or COMMIT
message and they complain. A malicious primary p can afford
not to send such messages up to at most f ′ replicas, without
getting caught as being malicious; that is, |Rc| ≤ f ′.
In this case, each of the complainers in Rc may have to
communicate with up to 2f + 1 window nodes, since this
guarantees a window that has at least one correct window
node. This gives at most (2f + 1)|Rc| messages. In the worst
case, out of the 2f + 1 window replicas at most f + 1 will be
the honest ones that will broadcast to all n replicas and will
receive their response, to be forwarded to the complainers Rc,
giving at most 2(f + 1)n+ (f + 1)|Rc| additional messages.
The total communication complexity in this case will be (since
|Rc| ≤ f ′ < n/3):
(2f + 1)|Rc|+ 2(f + 1)n+ (f + 1)|Rc|
≤ (5f + 4)n = O(fn+ n). (1)
2) Messages caused by malicious replicas: Suppose the
set of complainers Rc are malicious, thus, |Rc| ≤ f . Win-
dow nodes do not respond to repetitive complains from the
same replica (non-effective messages), which prevents mali-
cious replicas from increasing the communication complexity.
Nevertheless, each window node may respond once to each
malicious request. A window node j can respond to a complain
message in the following ways:
• If window node j has the appropriate response to the
complain (i.e. it has the block or COMMIT ) it will send
it back to the replica that complained. At most 2f ′ + 1
window nodes will be accessed by each replica in Rc,
since this is the bound on the total number of window
nodes. Therefore, in this case, the number of messages
are at most:
2(2f ′ + 1)|Rc| ≤ (4f ′ + 2)f
< (4n/3 + 2)f = O(fn+ n).
(2)
• If window node j does not have the appropriate response
(block or COMMIT ), then j itself is also executing
the window protocol from smaller to larger windows,
and when it eventually points to its own window, it
will broadcast the complaint to get a response from
other replicas (acting as a regular window node). This
scenario can only happen if all the previous windows are
populated by f faulty nodes. The number of complaints
from Rc to up to 2f ′ + 1 window nodes are bounded
by (2f ′ + 1)|Rc|. Similarly, the respective responses are
bounded by (2f ′ + 1)|Rc|. For calculating the messages
from the broadcasts, out of the 2f ′ + 1 total window
nodes, at most 2f + 1 window nodes will react to
the received complaints with broadcasts, since the first
encountered window of size at least f + 1 will respond
to any complaint from a valid node. Thus, each of the
up to 2f + 1 windows nodes broadcasts to all replicas,
causing (2f+1)n additional messages. Therefore, in this
case, the number of messages are at most:
2(2f ′ + 1)|Rc|+ (2f + 1)n
< (4n/3 + 2)f + (2f + 1)n = O(fn+ n).
(3)
C. View Change Communication Complexity
When a correct window node receives f ′ + 1 complaints it
will broadcast all of them to all replicas (n messages). There
are at most f + 1 window nodes that will broadcast (since
those window nodes could be correct in the last accessed
window size), resulting to at most (f + 1)n messages. Upon
receipt of the broadcast message, each replica begins the view
change process. The replica sends back a V IEWCHANGE
message to the new primary p′ which also includes its
history (n messages). The new primary p′ aggregates all
V IEWCHANGE messages into 〈Q〉σ′p and broadcasts (n
messages). Upon receipt each replica extracts the most recent
block as described in Section III-C. Therefore, the number of
messages from this part of the algorithm is at most:
(f + 1)n+ n+ n = fn+ 3n. (4)
During this, at least f ′ + 1 correct replicas have the latest
committed block s′, and this block is chosen as the starting
point for the next epoch, which will build another block (s′+1)
over it. All other replicas that have block number less than s′
as their latest block have to download all the blocks up to s′
from p′. If p′ does not have s′ as its latest block, then f ′ + 1
replicas that have it will bring p′ up to date. Thus, if f ′ + 1
replicas have s′ as their latest block, then, at most 2f ′ replicas
in the worst case get (download) messages up from the high
water mark in checkpoint H to s′. Let e be the number of
committed blocks from H to s′. For each committed block
we need two messages, first the block itself and the second is
the COMMIT message. Thus, we have:
2e(2f ′ + f ′) = 6ef ′. (5)
Assuming frequent checkpoints (say every a fixed number of
blocks), we can assume that e is a constant. From Equations
4 and 5 we have for the total number of messages in view
change:
fn+ 3n+ 6e(n/3) = O(fn+ n). (6)
D. Overall Messages
Combining Equations 1, 2, 3, we obtain O(fn+n) commu-
nication complexity in a single epoch for the communication
complexity between replicas. From Equation 6 the commu-
nication complexity is also O(fn + n) during view change.
Therefore, we have the following result:
Lemma 11. The number of messages exchanged between
replicas in an epoch or during view change are O(fn+ n).
Combining Lemmas 10 and 11 we obtain the main result
for the communication complexity:
Theorem 12 (Communication complexity). For τ initiated
transactions in an epoch, the communication complexity is
O(τn + fn). For constant τ , the communication complexity
is O(fn+ n).
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we proposed Musch, a BFT-based consensus
protocol, in an effort to avoid excessive messages and improve
the scalability of blockchain algorithms. Through the use of
windows, the algorithm adapts to the actual number of faulty
nodes f , and in this way it avoids unnecessary messages.
This improvement does not sacrifice on the latency, since our
algorithm still uses a small number of communication rounds.
For future work, it would be interesting to investigate whether
we can decrease the message complexity further, i.e. to O(n)
under f faults, by introducing an intelligent scheme to detect
faulty nodes and foil attempts to increase message complexity.
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